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Abstract. Privacy becomes a major concern for both customers and en-
terprises in today’s corporate marketing strategies, many research efforts
have been put into developing new privacy-aware technologies. Among
them, Hippocratic databases are one of the important mechanisms to
guarantee the respect of privacy principles in data management, which
adopt purpose as a central concept associated with each piece of data
stored in the databases. The proposed mechanism provides basic princi-
ples for future database systems protecting privacy of data as a founding
tenet. However, Hippocratic databases do not allow to distinguish which
particular method is used for fulfilling a purpose. Especially, the issues
like purpose hierarchies, task delegations and minimal privacy cost are
missing from the proposed mechanism.
In this paper, we extend these mechanisms in order to support inter-
organizational business processes in Hippocratic databases. A compre-
hensive approach for negotiation of personal information between cus-
tomers and enterprises based on user preferences is developed when
enterprises offer their clients a number of ways to fulfill a service. We
organize purposes into purpose directed graphs through AND/OR de-
composition, which supports task delegations and distributed authoriza-
tions. Specially, customers have controls of deciding how to get a service
fulfilled on the basis of their personal feeling of trust for any service cus-
tomization. Quantitative analysis is performed to characterize privacy
penalties dealing with privacy cost and customer’s trust. Finally, effi-
cient algorithms are given to guarantee the minimal privacy cost and
maximal customer’s trust involved in a business process.
1 Introduction
With the widespread use of information technology in all walks of life, personal
information is being collected, stored and used in various information systems.
Achieving privacy preservation has become a major concern. Issues related to
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privacy have been widely investigated and several privacy protecting techniques
have been developed. To our best knowledge, the most well known effort is
the W3C’s Platform for Privacy Preference (P3P) [10]. P3P allows websites to
express their privacy policy in a machine readable format so that using a software
agent, consumers can easily compare the published privacy policies against their
privacy preferences. While P3P provides a mechanism for ensuring that users
can be informed about privacy policies before they release personal information,
some other approaches are proposed [4, 8, 16, 17, 22], where the notion of purpose
plays an important role in order to capture the intended usage of information.
As enterprises collect and maintain increasing amounts of personal data,
individuals are exposed to greater risks of privacy breaches and identity theft,
many enterprises and organizations are deeply concerned about privacy issues as
well. Many companies, such as IBM and the Royal Bank Financial Group, use
privacy as a brand differentiator [3]. By demonstrating good privacy practices,
lots of business try to build solid trust to customers, thereby attracting more
customers [20, 5, 6, 12]. Together with the notion of purpose, current privacy leg-
islations also define the privacy principles that an information system has to
meet in order to guarantee customer’s privacy [11, 1, 2, 21]. Mechanism for nego-
tiation is presented by Tumer et al. [21]. Enterprises specify which information is
mandatory for achieving a service and which is optional, while customers specify
the type of access for each part of their personal information.
On the basis of the solution for the exchange between enterprises and cus-
tomers, Hippocratic databases enforced fine-grained disclosure policies to an ar-
chitecture at the data level [1]. In the proposed architecture, enterprises declared
the purpose for which the data are collected, who can receive them, the length
of time the data can be retained, and the authorized users who can access them.
Hippocratic databases also created a privacy authorization table shared by all
customers, but it does not allow to distinguish which particular method is used
for fulfilling a service. Moreover, enterprises are able to provide their services in
different ways, and each different method may require different data. For exam-
ple, notification can be done by email or by mobile phone or by fax. Depending
on the different kinds of methods, customers should provide different personal
information. Asking for all personal information for different service methods as
compulsory would clearly violate the principle of minimal disclosure.
On the server side, a single enterprise usually could not complete all pro-
cedures of a service by itself, rather a set of collaborating organizations partic-
ipating in the service. Enterprises might need to decompose a generic purpose
into more specific sub-purposes since they are not completely able to fulfill it
by themselves, and so they may delegate the fulfillment of sub-purposes to third
parties. It is up to customers to decide on a strategy of how to get a service
fulfilled on the basis of their personal feeling of trust for different service com-
ponents. A question that many customers have when interacting with a web
server, with an application, or with an information source is “Can I trust this
entity?”. Different customizations may require different data for which consid-
erations may vary; there might be different trust levels on different partners
(sub-contractors). The choice of service customization has significant impact on
the privacy of individual customers.
In this paper, we present an approach to automatically derive the optimal
way of authorizations needed to achieve a service from enterprise privacy poli-
cies. In particular, we organize purposes into purpose directed graphs through
AND/OR decompositions, which support the delegation of tasks and autho-
rizations when a host of partners participating in the business service provides
different ways to achieve the same service. Further, we allow customers to ex-
press their trust preferences associated with each partner of the business process.
Thus, a weight combining privacy cost and customer trust is given on each arc of
the graph in the form of privacy penalties, and the process for fulfilling a purpose
can be customized at runtime and guarantees minimal privacy cost and maxi-
mal customer trust because it was selected with criterion of the optimal privacy
penalty. Finally, an efficient algorithm is proposed to find optimal privacy-aware
path in Hippocratic databases. Our work is grounded on modeling and analysis of
purposes for Hippocratic databases and proposes enhancements to Hippocratic
database systems in order to deal with inter-organizational business processes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the
motivation of this paper based on a running example. Section 3 presents some
background information on Hippocratic database systems. We introduce purpose
directed graph with delegation in Section 4 and discuss how to characterize the
privacy penalty and efficiently find the optimal solution in Section 5. We provide
a brief survey of related work in Section 6. We conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 Motivation
We consider the following example throughout the paper.
Example: Ebay is an online seller in Australia and provides an online cat-
alogue to its customers who can search for the items they wish to buy. Once
customers have decided to buy goods, Ebay needs to obtain certain personal in-
formation from customers to perform purchase transactions. This information
includes name, shipping address, and credit card number. Ebay views purchase,
its ultimate purpose, as a three-step process: credit assessment, delivery, and no-
tification. Credit assessment relies on Credit Card Company (CCC). Delivery
can be done either by a delivery company or the post office, while notification
can be done by email or by mobile phone.
Obviously, Ebay provides many ways to achieve the purchase service and
each different method could require different data. An important principle is
that enterprises should disclose to customers which data is collected and for
what purpose. Also, enterprises should maintain minimal personal information
necessary to fulfill the purpose for which the information was collected.
From the customers’ point of view, they do not want to disclose more data
than needed to get the desired service; rather, they want the process that best
protects their privacy based on their preferences. Depending on the method of
notification, Ebay needs either an email address or a mobile phone number. For
example, Jimmy, a professor plagued by spam, may treasure his email address
and give away his business mobile phone number. Bob, a doctor whose mobile
phone is always ringing, may have the opposite preference. Therefore, it is up to
customers to decide how to get a service fulfilled on the basis of their personal
feeling of any service customization.
Furthermore, if we consider the delivery service, Ebay could not fulfill the
service by itself, but rather relies on a delivery company or post office. That
means Ebay may outsource a large part of data processing to third parties par-
ticipating in a single business process. However, the more the data is used, the
more likely it might be disclosed, since the personal information is transmitted
from one to another. This requires that enterprises maintain minimal personal
information necessary to fulfill the purpose. Moreover, the partners chosen by
Ebay might also be trusted differently by its potential customers. The burden
of choice is on the human who must decide what to do on the basis of his/her
personal feeling of trust of the enterprises. For instance, Albert may prefer to
delivery by a delivery company, since it is fast; whereas, Bob may chose deliv-
ery by post office because it is safe. Different partners (sub-contractors) chosen
for the same purpose may be with different trust levels. The choice of service
customization has significant impact on the privacy of individual customers.
If we consider these factors, both the privacy cost and customer’s trust
should be considered as important factors in privacy security system when enter-
prises publish comprehensive privacy policies involving hierarchies of purposes,
possibly spanning multiple partners. Formally, it can be stated as follows:
Minimal privacy cost: Is there a way to fulfill the purpose with minimal
privacy cost?
Maximal customer’s trust: Is there a way to fulfill the purpose with maximal
trust between enterprises and customers?
Classical privacy-aware database systems such as Hippocratic databases do
not consider these issues, we are interested in solutions that support customers
and companies alike, so that companies can publish comprehensive privacy poli-
cies involving multiple service methods, possibly delegation of tasks and autho-
rizations. Moreover, the solutions will allow customers to personalize services
based on their own privacy sensitivities and their trust of partners who might
contribute to the requested service.
3 Overview of Hippocratic databases
Hippocratic databases use purpose as a central concept [1]. A purpose describes
the reason(s) for data collection and data access, which is stored in the database
as a “special” attribute occurring in every table of the database. This attribute
specifies the purpose (reason/goal) for which a piece of information can be used.
For example, Table 1 shows the schema of two tables, customer and or-
der, that store the personal information including purposes. In particular, table
table attribute
customer purpose, customer-id, name, address, email, fax-number, credit-card-info
order purpose, customer-id, transaction, book-info, status
Table 1. Database schema
table attribute
privacy-polices purpose, table, attribute, {external-receipts}, {retention-period}
privacy-authorizations purpose, table, attribute, {authorized-users}
Table 2. Privacy metadata schema
customer stores personal information about customers, and table order stores in-
formation about the transactions between enterprises and their customers. Then,
for each purpose and data item stored in the database, we have:
External-recipients: the actors to whom the data item is disclosed ;
Retention-period: the period during which the data item should be maintained ;
Authorized-users: the users entitled to access the data item.
Purpose, external recipients, authorized users, and retention period are
stored in the database with respect to the metadata schema defined in Ta-
ble 2. Specifically, the above information is split into separate tables: external-
recipients and retention period are in the privacy-policies table, while authorized-
users in the privacy-authorizations table. The purpose is stored in both of them.
The privacy-policies table contains the privacy policies of the enterprise, while
privacy-authorizations table contains the access control policies that implement
the privacy policy and represents the actual disclosure of information. In par-
ticular, privacy-authorizations tables are derived from privacy-policies tables by
instantiating each external recipient with the corresponding users. Therefore,
Hippocratic database systems define one privacy-authorizations table for each
privacy-policies table, and these tables represent what information is actually
disclosed.
Hippocratic database system is an elegant and simple solution but does not
allow for dynamic situations that could arise with web services and business
process softwares. In such settings, enterprises may provide services in many
different ways and may delegate the execution of parts of the service to third
parties. This is indeed the case of a virtual organization based on business process
for web service where different partners explicitly integrate their efforts into one
process [15].
4 Purpose directed graph with delegation
Agrawal et al.[1] proposed a structure to split a purpose into multiple purposes
and then stored them in the database. Karjoth et al.[16] used a directory-like
notation to represent purpose hierarchies, which loses the logic relation between
a purpose and its sub-purposes. In particular, this notation does not distin-
guish if a sub-purpose is derived by AND or OR decomposition [19]. Assuming
a purpose p is AND-decomposed into sub-purposes p1, . . . , pn, then all of the
sub-purposes must be satisfied in order to satisfy p. For example, Ebay AND-
decomposes purchase into delivery, credit assessment, and notification, then all
of the three sub-purposes have to be fulfilled for fulfilling purchase purpose.
However, if a purpose p is OR-decomposed into sub-purposes p1, . . . , pn, then
one of the sub-purposes must be satisfied in order to satisfy p. For instance, Ebay
further OR-decomposes delivery into direct delivery relying on delivery compa-
nies and delivery by post office (shown in Fig.1). In this way, only one of them
could be necessary to fulfill the delivery purpose. In essence, AND-decomposition
is used to define the process for achieving a purpose, while OR-decomposition
defines alternatives for achieving a purpose.
Our approach is based on traditional goal analysis [18], and consists of
decomposing purposes into sub-purposes through an AND/OR refinement. The
idea is to represent purpose hierarchies with directed graphs.
Definition 1. A purpose directed graph PDG is a pair (P,A), where P is a set
of purposes and A is the set of arcs, each arc represents a hierarchical relation
between the purposes.
A purpose directed graph (PDG) can be used to represent goal models in
goal-oriented requirements engineering approaches [7]. For our purposes, they
represent the entire set of alternative ways for delivering a service required by
customers. Such representations can also be used to model the delegations of
tasks and authorizations in the security modeling methodology proposed by
Giorgini et al.[14].
An enterprise could provide different methods to achieve a service or rely
on different partners to achieve the same part of the service. In particular, Ebay
relies on a delivery company, Worldwide Express (WWEx), for shipping books.
Ebay needs to delegate customer’s information, such as name and shipping ad-
dress, to WWEx. In turn, WWEx depends on local delivery companies for door-
to-door delivery. To this end, WWEx delegates customer information to the local
delivery companies LDC1, · · ·, LDCn for door-to-door delivery. Consequently,
different processes can be used to fulfill the required service. To capture this
insight, we introduce the notion of path.
Definition 2. Let PDG = (P,A) be a purpose directed graph. A path from v0
to vm is defined as a sequence W = (v0, a1, v1, ..., am, vm), where ai is an arc
from vi−1 to vi for i = 1, ...,m.
A purpose directed graph PDG is rooted if it contains a vertex v, such that
all the vertices of PDG are reachable from v through a directed path. The vertex
v is called a root of PDG.
For example, consider the purpose directed graph depicted in Fig.1. Each
vertex is composed by two parts: a purpose identifier and an enterprise needed
to fulfill the purpose, and each of the purposes represents the policies of a single
enterprise. The vertex ‘purchase’ is the root of the graph and purchase is the
root-level purpose. Essentially, if a pathW = (v0, a1, v1, ..., am, vm) satisfies that
v0 is the root purpose and there exists no downward paths from vm, we say the
path is an essential path. An essential path represents a possible process through
which an enterprise can fulfill the root purpose.
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Fig. 1. Purpose directed graph
The enterprise-wide privacy policies are derived by looking at the Hippo-
cratic database of each partner involved in the business process and merging
them into a single purpose. Therefore, purposes can be recognized as the out-
come of a process of refinements of goals in security requirements modeling
methodologies[13]. The task delegation is indeed the case of a virtual organiza-
tion based on business process for web service where different partners explicitly
integrate their efforts into one process.
5 Finding Optimal Privacy-aware Path
Our goal is to decide which is the essential optimal privacy-aware path to fulfill
the root purpose with respect to the customer’s preference. This can be per-
formed through the following quantitative analysis.
5.1 Objective characterization
Since our reference business model is that of virtual organizations, we assume
that there will often be more than one way to deliver a service. Yet, they may
differ in an important aspect, notably they may require different private data
items, which incurs different privacy cost. Further, depending on each customer’s
individual preferences, the same decomposition path might have significantly
different trust values for different customers. In order to support quantitative
analysis, we need to introduce the notion of privacy penalty.
Definition 3. The privacy penalty of an arc a is defined as a pair wa = (α, β),
where α is the privacy cost and β is the customer’s trust value on the arc a.
Choice of α, β: The privacy penalty pair (α, β) on each arc can be pre-defined by
asking the enterprises and customers to specify the level of privacy cost and trust
they feel about the sub-suppliers. Since the personal information is transmitted
from one to another, this may increase the danger of the leakage of personal
information. Therefore, we use α to depict the privacy cost. Generally, we assume
that there are different trust values based on the customer’s personal feeling of
the trust on different service custormizations. For example, Bob prefers mobile
notification more than email notification because of the personal experience, so
there is a high trust value on mobile notification.
Intuitively, the privacy penalty of a path should consist of two parts: one
is the sum of the privacy cost on each arc and the other is the minimum trust
among these arcs.
Definition 4. Let P = (v0, a1, v1, · · · , am, vm) be a path in the PDG. Then, the
privacy penalty of the path ωP = ωa1 + . . . + ωam = (
∑m
i=1(αi),min
m
i=1(βi)),
where ωai = (αi, βi), i = 1, ...,m.
Essentially, a path represents a possible process through which an enterprise
can fulfill a root purpose. For our purpose, we use the sum of the private cost
of each arcs because we argue that the more a piece of data is used, the more
likely it might be misused. The smaller the sum is, the less the privacy cost
is. Therefore, sum measures are the ones that capture best one’s intuitions on
the cost of privacy. We also use the minimization function on trust values to
get the smallest trust value on this path. The larger the value is, the more the
trust is on this path. Our goal is to decide which is the process with the optimal
privacy penalty (i.e., the minimal privacy cost and maximal trust value) to fulfill
the root purpose with respect to the user’s preferences. In order to describe the
user’s preference, we next introduce a flexible objective function.
Flexible objective function: If the privacy penalty on the arc a is defined as
wa = (α, β), we introduce the following objective function to balance the privacy
cost and customer trust with a preference coefficient γ (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1).
alt(a) = γ × α+ (1− γ)× β (1)
The choice of parameter γ depends on the customer’s preference. If the customer
cares whether data are disclosed at all, then γ may be set with a value in the
interval 0.5 ≤ γ ≤ 1. On the other hand, if the customer stresses more on trust,
then γ can be set with a value between 0 and 0.5.
In addition to the objective function, we propose to decompose purposes into
sub-purposes through an AND/OR decomposition. In essence, AND-decomposition
is used to define the process for achieving a purpose, while OR-decomposition
defines alternatives for achieving a purpose. Normally, the node purpose can be
either AND-decomposed or OR-decomposed. A decomposition arc is either an
OR-arc or an AND-arc.
Definition 5. Let PDG = (P,A) be a purpose directed graph, for each vertex
v ∈ P , we denote OUT (v) = OUTor(v) ∪ OUTand(v) as the set of all succes-
sors of v, where OUTor(v) refers to all successors connecting v with OR-arcs,
and OUTand(v) stores all successors connecting v with AND-arcs. Especially, if
OUT (v) = ∅, we say the vertex v is a leaf of PDG.
For example, in Fig. 2 the root purpose r is AND-decomposed into three sub-
purposes: delivery, credit assessment and notification, thenOUT (r) = OUTand(r)
= {delivery, credit assessment and notification}. Further, considering the node
v with purpose ‘mobile notification’, since OUT (v) = ∅, then the node ‘mobile
notification’ is a leaf of the purpose directed graph.
5.2 The algorithm
In this section, we present efficient algorithms to track the optimal path that the
enterprises need to fulfill a purpose. Next, we analyze two situations in finding
the optimal privacy-aware path.
Case 1: if the root purpose is OR-decomposed, the algorithm consists of follow-
ing steps:
1. To contract each vertex v with all its successors in OUTand(v) to a com-
pound vertex vc; suppose OUTand(v) = {v1, · · · , vk}, we define cost[vc] =∑k
i=1 α(v, vi), trust[vc] = min
k
i=1 β(v, vi);
2. To transfer the purpose directed graph PDG into PDG with no AND-arcs
and find the optimal path p using function optimal path(PDG);
3. If the optimal path of PDG contains a compound vertex (or vertices), then
expand the compound vertex (or vertices) on p to become the optimal solu-
tion of PDG.
In Algorithm 1, α(u, v) represents the privacy cost between the two nodes u and
v, and β(u, v) refers to the trust value on the arc (u, v). For each leaf vertex,
Sum function is used to track the distance between the leaf and the root, while
predecessor[] records all predecessor vertices of the leaf, and previous[] records
the vertices on the optimal path from the leaf to the root. alt on line 10 is
the objective function with the preference coefficient γ. If γ ≥ 0.5 , it means
customers prefer more on privacy protection, then the minimal objective value
is needed depending on the minimization function; while if γ < 0.5, it means
customers prefer more on trust, then the maximal objective value is needed
depending on the maximization procedure.
Case 2: if the root purpose is AND-decomposed, in order to design efficient
algorithms to determine the process by which a service can be delivered with
optimal privacy penalties, we need the definition of sub-purpose directed graph.
Algorithm 1: optimal path(PDG,OR r)
Input: a purpose directed graph PDG with OR-decompoded root r.
Output: The optimal path D
1. Contract each vertex v with all its successors in OUTand(v) to
the compound vertex vc
2. Transfer PDG into PDG
3. p = optimal path(PDG)
4. If p contains compound vertex(vertices),
5. expand the compound vertex(vertices) on p to p,
6. D = p
7. else
8. D = p
function: optimal path(PDG):
Input: PDG with root purpose r and leaves v1, . . . , vk, pre-defined
privacy cost and trust function α(∗, ∗), β(∗, ∗), and
preference coefficient 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
0 for each vertex v (not a compound vertex) in PDG:
1 cost[v] := 0
2 trust[v] :=∞
3 for each leaf vi (i = 1, · · · , k)
4 Sum(vi) := 0, previous[vi] := {vi}
5 while r /∈ predecessor[vi] = {ui1 , · · · , uis}
6 {
7 for each uij (1 ≤ j ≤ s)
8 cost(uij , vi) := cost[vi] + cost[uij ] + α(uij , vi)
9 trust(uij , vi) := min{trust[vi], trust[uij ], β(uij , vi)}
10 alt(uij , vi) := γ × cost(uij , vi) + (1− γ)× trust(uij , vi)
11 if γ ≥ 0.5 /* prefer cost */
12 let alt(uim , vi) = min
s
j=1alt(uij , vi)
13 previous[vi] := previous[vi] ∪ {uim}
14 Sum(vi) := Sum(vi) + alt(uim , vi)
15 vi := uim
16 if γ < 0.5 /* prefer trust */
17 let alt(uim , vi) = max
s
j=1alt(uij , vi)
28 previous[vi] := previous[vi] ∪ {uim}
29 Sum(vi) := Sum(vi) + alt(uim , vi)
20 vi := uim
21 }
22 /*end while and all paths from the leaf to the root are found*/
23 if γ ≥ 0.5
24 assume Sum(vt) = min
k
i=1Sum(vi), (1 ≤ t ≤ k)
25 output previous[vt]
26 if γ < 0.5
27 assume Sum(vt) = max
k
i=1Sum(vi), (1 ≤ t ≤ k)
28 output previous[vt]
29 end function
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Fig. 2. sub PDG in Purpose directed graph
Definition 6. Let PDG = (P,A) be a purpose directed graph, if the root purpose
r is AND-decomposed into several sub-purposes, then each sub-purpose with all
its descendants form a sub-purpose directed graph of PDG, and we denote it by
sub PDG. Essentially, if the root of the sub PDG is further AND-decomposed
into several sub-purposes, then each sub-purpose with all its descendants form a
sub-purpose directed graph of sub PDG, which is also a sub-sub-purpose directed
graph of PDG, and we denote it by sub (sub PDG).
For example, in Fig. 2 Ebay AND-decomposes purpose purchase into three
sub-purposes: delivery, credit assessment and notification. According to the defi-
nition of sub-purpose directed graph, the purpose delivery with all its decedents
consist of a sub-purpose directed graph. The same situation applies to the other
two sub-purposes, so there are three sub-purpose directed graphs as in Fig. 2
(circled in broken line). Since in each sub-purpose directed graph, the root is
further OR-decomposed, there is no sub-sub-purpose directed graph in Fig. 2.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the root of each sub (sub PDG)
is OR-decomposed. In this case, the algorithm consists of following steps:
1. To decompose the purpose directed graph PDG into several sub-purpose
directed graphs.
2. For each sub-purpose directed graph sub PDG with root purpose r,
(a) if the root purpose r is OR-decomposed, run algorithm optimal path(sub PDG,
OR r) to find the optimal path in sub PDG;
(b) if the root purpose r is AND-decomposed, further decompose the sub PDG
into several sub-sub-purpose directed graphs, then run algorithm optimal path
(sub (sub PDG), OR r′) to find the optimal path in each sub (sub PDG)
with root r′. Combine all the optimal paths of each sub (sub PDG) into
the optimal solution of sub PDG.
3. To combine all the optimal paths of each sub PDG into the optimal solution
of PDG.
Algorithm 2: optimal path(PDG,AND r)
Input: A purpose directed graph PDG with AND-decomposed root
Output: The optimal path D
1. decompose PDG into several sub PDG
2. for each sub PDG with root r
3. if the root r is OR-decomposed in sub PDG
4. run algorithm optimal path(sub PDG,OR r)
5. output por = optimal path(sub PDG)
6. if the root r is AND-decomposed in sub PDG
7. further decompose the sub PDG into several sub (sub PDG)s
2. for each sub (sub PDG) with root r′
8. run algorithm optimal path(sub (sub PDG), OR r′)
9. output pand = optimal path(sub PDG)
10. D = (∪por) ∪ (∪pand)
In Algorithm 2, por refers to the optimal path of sub PDG with an OR-
decomposed root, while pand refers to the optimal path of sub PDG with an
AND-decomposed root.
Until here, ether the root purpose is AND-decomposed or OR-decomposed,
we can find the optimal path under any specific value of γ through our algo-
rithms. If γ ≥ 0.5, it means the customer stresses more on privacy cost. The
optimal solution to satisfy the customer’s preference is the optimal path with
the minimal objective value when varying the value of γ. Our method is to search
all the possible optimal path based on the value of γ from 0.5 to 1 by the interval
of 0.01. Then, the optimal path with the minimal objective value will be chosen
as the optimal solution. For the situation γ < 0.5, we search all the possible
optimal path based on the value of γ from 0 to 0.5 by the interval of 0.01. Then,
the optimal path with the maximal objective value will be chosen as the optimal
solution, since the customer prefers more on trust.
6 Related work
Our work is related to several topics in the area of privacy and security for
data management, namely privacy policy specification, privacy-preserving data
management systems and multilevel secure database systems. We now briefly
survey the most relevant approaches in these areas and point out the differences
of our work with respect to these approaches.
The W3Cs Platform for Privacy Preference (P3P) [23] allows web sites to
encode their privacy practice, such as what information is collected, who can
access the data for what purposes, and how long the data will be stored by the
sites, in a machine-readable format. P3P enabled browsers can read this privacy
policy automatically and compare it to the consumers set of privacy preferences
which are specified in a privacy preference language such as a P3P preference
exchange language (APPEL) [10], also designed by the W3C. Even though P3P
provides a standard means for enterprises to make privacy promises to their
users, P3P does not provide any mechanism to ensure that these promises are
consistent with the internal data processing. By contrast, the work in our paper
provides an effective strategy to maximize privacy protection. Further, we allow
customers to express their trust preferences associated with each partner of the
business process in order to achieve maximal customer trust.
Byun et al. presented a comprehensive approach for privacy preserving ac-
cess control based on the notion of purpose [9, 8]. In the model, purpose infor-
mation associated with a given data element specifies the intended use of the
data element, and the model allows multiple purposes to be associated with each
data element. The granularity of data labeling is discussed in detail in [9], and
a systematic approach to implement the notion of access purposes, using roles
and role-attributes is presented in [8]. Similar to our approach, they introduce
purpose hierarchies in order to reason on access control. Their hierarchies are
based on the principles of generalization and specification and are not expres-
sive enough to support complex strategies defined by enterprises. However, we
organize purposes into purpose directed graph through AND/OR decomposi-
tion, which supports the delegation of tasks and authorizations when a host of
partners participating in the business process provides different ways to achieve
the same service. We also present an efficient method to automatically derive
the optimal way of authorizations needed to achieve a service from enterprise
privacy policies.
The concept of Hippocratic databases, incorporating privacy protection
within relational database systems, was introduced by Agrawal et al.[1]. The
proposed architecture uses privacy metadata, which consist of privacy policies
and privacy authorizations stored in two tables. LeFevre et al.[2] enhance Hip-
pocratic databases with mechanisms for enforcing queries to respect privacy
policies stated by an enterprise and customer preferences. In essence, they pro-
pose to enforce the minimal disclosure principle by providing mechanisms to
data owners that control as who can access their personal data and for which
purpose. Although the work on the Hippocratic databases[1, 2] is closely related
to ours, our approach has some notable differences. First, we introduce more
sophisticated concepts of purpose, i.e., purposes are organized in purpose di-
rected graph through AND/OR decomposition. The second difference is that
Hippocratic databases does not allow to distinguish which particular method is
used; whereas, we discuss the situations that could arise with web services and
business process software. Third, we provide an efficient method to automati-
cally derive the optimal way of authorizations needed to achieve a service from
enterprise privacy policies.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the purposes behind the design of Hippocratic database
systems, and organize them in hierarchal manner through AND/OR decompo-
sition. We apply the purpose directed graph to characterize the ways the en-
terprised need to achieve a service which may rely on many different partners.
Specially, the selection of the partners and the identification of a particular plan
to fulfill a purpose is driven by the customer’s preference. We use a goal-oriented
approach to analyze privacy policies of the enterprises involved in a business pro-
cess, in which one can determine the minimum disclosure of data for fulfilling
the root purpose with respect to customer’s maximum trust. On the basis of the
purpose directed graph derived through a goal refinement process, we provide
efficient algorithms to determine the optimal privacy-aware path for achieving a
service. This allows to automatically derive access control policies for an inter-
organizational business process from the collection of privacy policies associated
with different participating enterprises.
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